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On October 5, 2015, the OECD and G20 released the final BEPS package. It 
included the following new preamble to the OECD model tax treaty:
(State A) and (State B)…Intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination 
of  double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without 
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax 
evasion or avoidance…(emphasis added)
This language embodies the OECD and G20’s official commitment to preventing 
both double taxation and double non-taxation, i.e., to the single tax principle.
The official press release that accompanied the final package quoted OECD 
Secretary General Angel Gurria as stating that “[t]he measures we are presenting 
today represent the most fundamental changes to international tax rules in almost 
a	century”.	How	innovative	is	the	final	BEPS	package?
This paper will argue that while there is some innovation in BEPS, it is in fact more 
of  a continuation that a sharp break with the past. Like Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
French Revolution, BEPS represents both continuity and change.1 In particular, the 
single tax principle has formed the theoretical basis of  much of  the international 
tax regime from the beginning. And it is in fact this continuity rather than any 
sharp change that gives the final BEPS package its promise to, as Secretary General 
Gurria also promised, “put an end to double non-taxation.”
2. The Single Tax Principle
Since 1997, I have argued that a coherent international tax regime exists that is 
embodied in both tax treaties and the domestic laws of  most countries, including 
the United States, and that limits the practical ability of  countries to adopt any 
international tax rules they choose. I further argued that the core of  the international 
tax regime is two principles, which I call the benefits principle (active income 
should be taxed primarily at source and passive income primarily at residence) and 
the single tax principle (all income should be subject to tax once at the rate derived 
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from the benefits principle, i.e., active income at the 
consensus corporate rate and passive income at the 
residence rate for individuals).2 
This formulation has been highly controversial. 
While most commentators would agree that 
the benefits principle has been the core of  the 
international tax regime since 1923, many deny the 
validity of  the single tax principle and some doubt 
its coherence.3 In particular, the single tax principle 
suggests that whenever the country that has primary 
jurisdiction under the benefits principle refrains 
from taxing cross-border income, the other country 
(residence for active income, source for passive) 
should tax it instead. This seemed to fly in the face 
of  observed reality because residence countries 
typically exempt or defer active income, and source 
countries refrain from taxing many forms of  passive 
income unilaterally without regard to whether it is 
taxed at residence.
There are, however, elements of  US international 
tax that seem consistent with the single tax 
principle. The decision in 1918 to prevent double 
taxation by granting a foreign tax credit rather than 
an exemption was justified by Thomas Adams in 
terms of  the single tax principle.4 The adoption of  
the foreign passive holding company rule in 1935, 
followed by the PFIC rule in 1986, seems intended 
to ensure effective residence based taxation of  
passive income that is unlikely to be taxed at source. 
The adoption of  Subpart F in 1962 was premised 
on the assumption that the type of  income that can 
be deferred (active income) is likely to be taxed at 
source at rates comparable to the US rate, and that 
other types of  income (passive and base company 
income) for which this assumption does not hold 
should be taxed on a residence basis regardless of  
the benefits principle (since some of  them, especially 
base company income, are active income that should 
generally be taxed primarily at source).5
These examples all relate to the US as a residence 
country. As a source country the first U.S. income 
tax treaty was concluded with France in 1932, and it 
reduced U.S. withholding taxes (e.g., on royalties to 
zero)	at	a	 time	when	France	was	purely	territorial,	
i.e., did not tax foreign source income. Thus, at 
approximately the same time that the U.S. was 
enacting the foreign personal holding corporation 
provisions to ensure that its residents pay tax on 
income that was unlikely to be taxed at source, it 
was tolerating double non-taxation of  U.S. source 
income earned by non-residents. The same tolerance 
applied to U.S. tax treaties, which were commonly 
extended to tax havens.
This began to change in the 1960s under the guidance 
of  Stanley Surrey, the author of  Subpart F and a 
major architect of  the international tax regime.6 
The first U.S. treaty that indicated that double non-
taxation of  U.S. source income was inappropriate 
was the treaty with Luxembourg, which precluded 
the application of  reduced U.S. withholding rates to 
certain Luxembourgian holding corporations that 
were not subject to tax on a residence basis.7 Similar 
language appears in the 1963 protocol to the Antilles 
Treaty, in the 1970 U.S. treaty with Finland and the 
1975 U.S. treaty with Iceland.8 The U.K. treaty of  
1975 imposed limitations on the benefits of  corporate 
residents if  the tax imposed by the residence country 
was “substantially less” than the general corporate 
tax and twenty-five percent or more of  the company 
was held by third-country residents.9	 However,	 the	
limitation did not apply to U.K. close companies 
or to companies held by U.K. individuals, giving 
rise to Rosenbloom’s comment that “it is difficult to 
discern a coherent U.K. treaty policy in the article.”10 
The 1978 protocol to the treaty with France likewise 
contained only narrow limitations.
In general, therefore, U.S. policy before 1979 did not 
significantly restrict double non-taxation in regard 
to U.S. source income, despite placing significant 
unilateral limits on double non-taxation when 
the United States was the country of  residence. 
However,	 in	 1979,	 following	 congressional	
hearings that revealed the extensive use of  the 
Antilles Treaty by third-country residents, the U.S. 
Treasury announced its intention to reexamine the 
Antilles Treaty and a series of  treaty extensions to 
U.K. colonies and former colonies. In 1981, the 
U.S. Treasury published the new U.S. Model Tax 
Treaty, which for the first time included a broad 
LOB provision applicable to both corporations 
and individuals.11 This provision provided that the 
benefits of  reduced withholding under the treaty 
will not apply to nonpublicly-traded corporations 
residing in the treaty partner, unless over seventy-
five percent of  such corporations are owned by 
individual residents and their income is not paid 
out to residents of  third countries. Additionally, 
the LOB provided that treaty benefits will not be 
available to corporations entitled to a significantly 
lower tax rate in their country of  residence.12 
Subsequent to the 1981 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, 
the LOB provision became a standard part of  all 
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U.S. treaties. It was next included in the treaties 
with Cyprus (1981), Jamaica (1981), New Zealand 
(1982), Australia (1982), Denmark (1983), France 
(1983)—and every U.S. treaty since. Indeed, ever 
since the Senate in 1981 refused to ratify the treaty 
with Argentina unless it included a LOB, it has been 
clear that no U.S. treaty will be ratified without 
a LOB. And in 1986, Congress created a treaty 
override by adopting a “qualified resident” test (a 
simple LOB) in the context of  the branch profits 
tax, which made it applicable to all U.S. treaties, 
including the majority that did not yet have an LOB 
provision.13
Some argue that the creation of  the LOB provision 
had nothing to do with double taxation, but was 
meant to prevent the United States from having a 
“treaty with the world.” (i.e., allowing any non-
resident to achieve treaty benefits without residing 
in a treaty jurisdiction) by restricting treaty benefits 
to residents of  that state and not allowing the 
extension of  benefits to residents of  other states, 
regardless of  whether they were subject to tax at 
the residence. This, it can be argued, was also the 
purpose of  the termination of  the treaties with the 
Antilles and other tax havens in 1987.14
But, this limited view of  the purpose of  the LOB 
provision is inconsistent with the last paragraph 
of  the 1981 model LOB, which explicitly makes 
the reduction of  source-based taxation contingent 
on taxation at residence without regard to the 
ownership of  the recipient of  the income. It is also 
inconsistent with the contemporaneous views held 
by Rosenbloom who, as International Tax Counsel 
from 1977 to 1981, was responsible for the inclusion 
of  the LOB provision in the 1981 U.S. Model Tax 
Treaty and other treaties of  that period. In an article 
published in 1983, Rosenbloom explained the policy 
behind the LOB provision: 
Many commentators believe that existing 
international commerce is, to a considerable 
extent, structured on the assumption that 
liberal use of  treaties will be tolerated. . . 
.The fundamental goal of  tax treaties is 
removal of  the negative effects of  double 
taxation…Since treaties are intended to 
eliminate double taxation, their benefits 
should flow to persons who, in the absence 
of  the treaty, might be subject to double 
taxation. These are persons who, while 
potentially subject to tax in one country 
on either a source or a personal basis, are 
also subject to tax in the other country on 
a personal basis. A principal task of  treaty 
drafters, then, should be to identify those 
persons in each country who are subject to 
that country’s personal taxing jurisdiction. 
. . . It may prove necessary in some cases to 
adopt special rules to ensure that taxation on 
a personal basis is not avoided altogether.15
While Rosenbloom later mentioned the “treaty 
with the world” problem and the revenue impact 
of  allowing third-country investors to benefit from 
a treaty, the principal thrust of  these observations 
is that the United States (as a source jurisdiction) 
should not reduce its withholding tax, unless it has 
some reasonable assurance that the income will be 
subject to tax on a residence basis.16 
By 1981, the single tax principle had become a 
foundation block of  U.S. international tax policy. As 
Rosenbloom stated, “One possible course would be 
for Country X not to enter into a treaty relationship 
unless it is satisfied that State Y will be likely to 
impose a full tax on all persons falling within the 
personal jurisdiction of  State Y. In theory, then, at 
least a single, substantial tax will be collected.”17 
In 1984, the US adopted the dual consolidated loss 
rule, which (as Rosenbloom acknowledged in his 
later critique of  the single tax principle) was the 
high point of  commitment because it incorporated 
the principle into domestic US law.18
However,	 subsequent	 developments	 have	 led	 to	
significant erosion in the US commitment to the 
single tax principle. This began in 1984 with the 
adoption of  the portfolio interest exemption, which 
relieves US source interest from taxation at source 
without regard to whether it was taxed at residence. 
The portfolio interest exemption has been followed 
by the rest of  the world because no country can 
afford to tax interest if  the largest economy does not 
do so.19 
The decline in the US commitment to the single 
tax principle continued with a series of  enactment 
that created new exceptions to Subpart F: The 
repeal of  section 956A (1994), the banking and 
insurance exceptions (1997), and the adoption of  
check the box (1997). The broad use of  check the 
box to change pre-existing international tax rules 
like Subpart F was unintended, and was followed 
immediately by Notice 98-11 that represented an 
attempt to undo the damage, but the genie was out 
of  the bottle: Congress blocked the Notice from 
going into effect and subsequently enacted section 
954(c)(6) to codify the harmful international effect 
of  check the box. The effect of  these provisions was 
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to enable US-based multinationals to defer tax on 
the Subpart F (passive and base company) income 
of  their CFCs without triggering deemed dividends, 
resulting in a massive $2.1 trillion that are currently 
“trapped” in CFCs located in low tax jurisdictions 
and that cannot be repatriated because of  the 35% 
tax on actual dividends.
Nevertheless, despite these unfortunate 
developments, in other areas the US did maintain its 
commitment to the single tax principle. This can be 
seen especially in the treaty context by the insistence 
on LOB rules, by the conduit financing regulations 
under Code 7701(l), and by the enactment of  anti-
arbitrage provisions like Code 894(c). Even outside 
the treaty context the IRS challenged a variety of  
tax arbitrage schemes that result in double non-
taxation, like the STARS transactions and other 
“foreign tax credit generators.” And Congress 
enacted sections 871(m) (to crack down on the use 
of  derivatives to avoid withholding on dividends) 
and 901(k) and 7701(o)(2) (to address foreign tax 
credit tax arbitrage transactions, like the Compaq 
transaction). It can therefore be argued that the 
fundamental commitment of  the US to the single 
tax principle remained unchanged despite the 
portfolio interest exemption and “check the box.”
The financial crisis of  2008 and the UBS scandal led 
to increased US concern about both tax evasion (US 
citizens	pretending	to	be	 foreigners	and	abusing	the	
portfolio interest exemption) and tax avoidance (the 
increased attention to what Ed Kleinbard has dubbed 
“stateless	 income”	 and	 the	 realization	 that	 “base	
erosion and profit shifting” (BEPS) does not just 
harm other countries but the US as well).20 The result 
has been an increased commitment to the single tax 
principle in both the US and overseas. This can be 
seen	in	FATCA	and	its	progeny,	in	the	G20/OECD	
BEPS project, and in the new US model treaty. 
3. FATCA and MAATM
FATCA was initially adopted in 2010 in response 
to the UBS case, and on the face of  it FATCA is 
just about requiring foreign financial institutions 
to	 report	 accounts	 controlled	 by	 US	 citizens	 or	
residents directly to the IRS. Because FATCA has 
real teeth (non-complying FFIs that derive US 
source income are subject to 30% withholding) and 
because it violates local privacy laws, it initially met 
with huge resistance. But the US Treasury was able 
to negotiate Intergovernmental Agreements with 
over 100 countries to permit FFIs to transfer the 
information to their own governments, which would 
then share it under treaties. That, in turn, led to the 
development of  standard information exchange 
rules that culminated in the Multilateral Agreement 
on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(MAATM), which has now been signed by over 80 
countries (including the US) and which provides for 
automatic exchange of  information with no bank 
secrecy or dual criminality exceptions. At the same 
time,	 the	 US	 has	 now	 finalized	 regulations	 first	
proposed in 2000 to require US financial institutions 
to collect data on payments that qualify for the 
portfolio interest exemption. 
These developments promise to deal a significant blow 
to tax evasion and consequent double non-taxation. In 
fact, Gabriel Zucman has recently estimated that total 
global tax evasion is only $200 billion annually, which 
may seem like a big number but is actually very small in 
comparison to overall financial income.21	His	estimate	
of US tax evasion and avoidance is only $36 billion, 
which is much smaller than some previous estimates 
(e.g., a commonly used number of  $100 billion which 
conflates tax evasion and avoidance, or my 2005 
estimate of  $50 billion for tax evasion).22 It may be 
that Zucman is under-estimating, but it is also possible 
that the deterrence effect of  FATCA and MAATM has 
worked and that the scope of  the problem is indeed 
smaller now than it was before 2010. 
In any case, these developments indicate a global 
commitment to enforce taxation of  passive income 
at residence and to limit the scope of  the portfolio 
interest exemption by subjecting payments to 
potential automatic exchange of  information. 
It should be remembered that even the original 
portfolio interest exemption has a provision (Code 
871(h)(6))	 that	 authorizes	 the	Treasury	 to	 suspend	
the exemption for countries that do not cooperate 
with exchange of  information. This provision has 
much more bite in the age of  MAATM. 
4. BEPS 
In introducing the final BEPS package on October 5, 
2015, OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria stated 
that:
“Base erosion and profit shifting affects all countries, 
not only economically, but also as a matter of  trust. 
BEPS is depriving countries of  precious resources 
to jump-start growth, tackle the effects of  the 
global economic crisis and create more and better 
opportunities for all. But beyond this, BEPS has been 
also	eroding	the	trust	of 	citizens	in	the	fairness	of 	tax	
systems worldwide. The measures we are presenting 
today represent the most fundamental changes to 
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international tax rules in almost a century: they will 
put an end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better 
alignment of  taxation with economic activity and 
value creation, and when fully implemented, these 
measures will render BEPS-inspired tax planning 
structures ineffective”.23
While this is no doubt over optimistic, there is no 
questioning the new found resolve of  the G20 and 
OECD to uphold the single tax principle. This goal 
can be seen in all of  the BEPS action steps:
Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges 
of the Digital Economy
This step is designed to address the ability 
of  multinationals to avoid taxation of  active 
income at source by selling goods and 
services into an economy without having 
a PE. In a world in which most residence 
jurisdictions exempt or defer taxation of  
active income changing the PE physical 
presence standard is essential to prevent 
double non-taxation. 
Action 2: Neutralising the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
This step is obviously designed to address 
double non-taxation by limiting tax 
arbitrage	 transactions	 designed	 to	 utilize	
hybrid mismatches to create double non-
taxation. Check the box is a target.
Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled 
Foreign Company Rules
This step is intended to enforce effective 
residence-based taxation of  income that is 
not taxed at source by limiting the scope of  
exemption and deferral to income that is 
subject to source based taxation.
Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving 
Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments
This step is designed to enforce source 
based taxation of  active income by 
limiting interest and related deductions 
that erode the corporate tax base without 
corresponding inclusions at residence.
Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax 
Practices More Effectively, Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance 
This step is intended to reinforce source 
based taxation of  active income by putting 
limits on harmful tax competition involving 
special regimes like patent boxes and 
cashboxes, and by requiring real investment 
that raises the transaction costs. 
Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances
This action adopts the US LOB position 
that treaty benefits should not result in 
reduction of  tax at source unless there is 
effective taxation at residence, including 
a “main purpose test” that states that the 
purpose of  treaties is to prevent both double 
taxation and double non-taxation. 
Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance 
of Permanent Establishment Status
This action reinforces source based taxation 
of  active income and prevents the Shifting of  
such income into low tax jurisdictions through 
commissionaire and similar arrangements.
Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing 
Outcomes with Value Creation
These actions build on earlier OECD work 
by limiting the ability to shift income to low 
tax jurisdictions by transfer pricing.
Action 11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS
This	 action	 attempts	 to	 incentivize	
governments to act on BEPS by measuring 
its Magnitude (between $100 and $240 
billion reach year in tax avoided).
Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules
This action seeks to prevent secret rulings 
that enable multinationals to pay very low 
effective tax rate in countries that appear to 
have high corporate tax rates. 
Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting
This action seems to bolster transfer pricing 
by requiring country by country reporting 
by multinationals, so that tax avoidance can 
be measured and source taxation of  active 
income upheld.
Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms More Effective
This action builds on previous OECD work 
on mandatory arbitration in tax treaties to 
prevent double taxation. It is a necessary 
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corollary to the steps that limit double non-
taxation.
Action 15: Developing a Multilateral In-
strument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties
This action is intended to improve 
coordination of  the previous steps. 
Overall this is a very impressive achievement in a very 
short span of  time. While BEPS will not eliminate 
double non-taxation any time soon, it demonstrates 
significant political commitment by the G20 and 
OECD to the single tax principle. It builds on earlier 
OECD actions like the commentary on article 1 that 
incorporates LOB principles, and that according to 
OECD applies to all treaties that include article 1, 
which is every tax treaty.
Whatever we think about the efficacy of  BEPS (and 
I have some doubts in this regard and in regard to the 
actual outcomes incorporated in the final package, 
which Inevitably reflect political compromises as 
well as MNE push-back),24 I think the OECD CTPA 
did	an	amazing	job	in	a	very	short	time	frame.	BEPS	
represents a commitment to the single tax principle 
more than anything that has happened since 1927, 
and that by itself  is a major achievement.
5. The New US Model
Anticipating the outcome of  BEPS, the US in May 
2015 released several proposed amendments to its 
model tax treaty, all of  which are consistent with 
the single tax principle. These changes were all 
incorporated in the US Model released in February 
2016.
a. Treaty Exempt PEs
New Article 1 Section 7 excludes from the 
withholding tax reductions of  the treaty payments 
to a permanent establishment of  a company of  the 
treaty partner in a third state if-
the profits of  that permanent establishment 
are subject to a combined aggregate 
effective rate of  tax in the [treaty partner 
state] and the state in which the permanent 
establishment is situated of  less than 60 
percent of  the general rate of  company tax 
applicable in the [treaty partner state] 
or if  the PE is situated in a third state that does 
not have a tax treaty with the US and the PE is not 
subject to tax in the treaty partner.
This provision is intended to prevent treaty benefits 
to accruing to a company resident in a treaty party 
that applies territoriality so as to exclude the profits 
of  branches in low-tax jurisdiction. The effect of  the 
provision would be to impose full 30% withholding 
on payments to such branches, consistently with 
the single tax principle and with the branch rule of  
Subpart F.
b. Expanded LOB
The new LOB article is a significant tightening of  
existing LOB rules. For example, the requirement 
that if  a company is traded on a stock exchange, that 
stock exchange must be in the same country that the 
company is in, is intended to address “inversion” 
transactions in which US companies inverted 
to Bermuda, had the board meet in Barbados to 
qualify under the US-Barbados treaty, and claimed 
exemption from LOB because they were publicly 
traded on the NYSE. 
In addition, similarly to the 1981 LOB, treaty 
benefits are denied to a company unless—
ii) with respect to benefits under this 
Convention other than under Article 10 
(Dividends), less than 50 percent of  the 
company’s gross income, and less than 50 
percent of  the tested group’s gross income, 
is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in 
the form of  payments that are deductible 
for purposes of  the taxes covered by this 
Convention in the company’s Contracting 
State of  residence (but not including arm’s 
length payments in the ordinary course of  
business for services or tangible property), 
either to persons that are not residents 
of  either Contracting State entitled to 
the benefits of  this Convention under 
subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of  this 
paragraph or to persons that meet this 
requirement but that benefit from a special 
tax regime in their Contracting State of 
residence with respect to the deductible 
payment. (emphasis added).
“Special tax regime” is a newly defined 
term:
l) the term “special tax regime” with respect 
to an item of  income or profit means any 
legislation, regulation or administrative 
practice that provides a preferential 
effective rate of taxation to such income 
or profit, including through reductions in 
the tax rate or the tax base. With regard to 
interest, the term special tax regime includes 
notional deductions that are allowed with 
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respect	 to	 equity.	 However,	 the	 term	 shall	
not include any legislation, regulation or 
administrative practice: 
i) the application of  which does not 
disproportionately benefit interest, royalties 
or other income, or any combination 
thereof; 
ii) that, with regard to royalties, satisfies a 
substantial activity requirement;  
iii)  that implements the principles of  Article 
7 (Business Profits) or Article 9 (Associated 
Enterprises); 
iv) that applies principally to persons that 
exclusively promote religious, charitable, 
scientific, artistic, cultural or educational 
activities; 
v) that applies principally to persons 
substantially all of  the activity of  which is to 
provide or administer pension or retirement 
benefits; 
vi) that facilitates investment in entities that 
are marketed primarily to retail investors, 
are widely-held, that hold real property 
(immovable property), a diversified portfolio 
of  securities, or any combination thereof, 
and that are subject to investor-protection 
regulation in the Contracting State in which 
the investment entity is established; or 
vii) that the Contracting States have agreed 
shall not constitute a special tax regime 
because it does not result in a low effective 
rate of  taxation (emphasis added).
This means that the withholding tax reductions of  
the treaty will not apply to a company 50% or more 
of  its income (or of  the income of  its consolidated 
group) is paid in deductible payments either to 
residents of  third countries or to a company in 
the treaty partner country that is subject to a low 
effective tax rate because of  a “special tax regime.” 
As in the 1981 LOB, this provision makes it clear 
that the purpose of  the LOB is to enforce the single 
tax principle, not just to prevent a treaty with the 
world.
c. Anti-Inversion Rules
New language is added to articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 
to the effect that dividends, interest, royalties and 
other income paid by an “expatriated entity” can be 
subject to 30% withholding tax for a period of  ten 
years after the inversion that created it. Since most 
“second wave” inversions are to treaty jurisdictions 
and the treaty is essential to the purpose of  the 
inversion, which is to generate double non-taxation 
by stripping earnings out of  the US into low tax 
jurisdictions (e.g., through the Netherlands or 
Ireland, as in the infamous double Irish Dutch 
sandwich), this will be a significant blow to 
inversions when it is included in actual treaties.
d. Special Tax Regimes
The newly defined “special tax regime” will, in 
accordance with the Technical Explanation, also 
prevent reduction of  withholding taxes under 
articles 11, 12 and 21.
The Technical Explanation provides that:
Subparagraph 1(l) defines the term “special 
tax regime” with respect to an item of  
income. The term is used in Articles 11 
(Interest), 12 (Royalties), and 21 (Other 
Income), each of  which denies treaty 
benefits to items of  income if  the resident 
of  the other Contracting State (the residence 
State) beneficially owning the interest, 
royalties, or other income, is related to the 
payor of  such income, and benefits from 
a special tax regime in its residence State 
with respect to the particular category of  
income. This rule allows the Contracting 
State in which the item of  income arises to 
retain its right to tax the income under its 
domestic law if  the resident benefits from a 
regime in the residence State with respect to 
a category of  income that includes the item 
of  income that results in low or no taxation. 
The term “special tax regime” also is used 
in Article 22 (Limitation on Benefits) for 
the purposes of  the so-called “derivative 
benefits” rule in paragraph 4 of  that Article. 
The application of  the term “special 
tax regime” in Articles 11, 12 and 21 is 
consistent with the tax policy considerations 
that are relevant to the decision to enter into 
a tax treaty, or to amend an existing tax 
treaty, as articulated by the Commentary 
to the OECD Model, as amended by 
the Base Erosion and Profits Shifting 
initiative. In particular, paragraph 15.2 of  
the introduction of  the OECD Model now 
provides: 
“Since a main objective of  tax treaties is 
the avoidance of  double taxation in order 
to reduce tax obstacles to cross-border 
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services, trade and investment, the existence 
of  risks of  double taxation resulting from 
the interaction of  the tax systems of  the two 
States involved will be the primary tax policy 
concern. Such risks of  double taxation will 
generally be more important where there is 
a significant level of  existing or projected 
cross-border trade and investment between 
two States. Most of  the provisions of  tax 
treaties seek to alleviate double taxation by 
allocating taxing rights between two States 
and it is assumed that where a State accepts 
treaty provisions that restrict its right to tax 
elements of  income, it generally does so 
on the understanding that these elements 
of  income are taxable in the other State. 
Where a State levies no or low income 
taxes, other States should consider whether 
there are risks of  double taxation that 
would justify, by themselves, a tax treaty. 
States should also consider whether there 
are elements of  another State’s tax system 
that could increase the risk of  non-taxation, 
which may include tax advantages that are 
ring-fenced from the domestic economy.” 
The term “special tax regime” means any 
legislation, regulation, or administrative 
practice that provides a preferential effective 
rate of  taxation to interest, royalties or 
other income, including through reductions 
in the tax rate or tax base. In the case of  
interest, the term includes any legislation, 
regulation, or administrative practice, 
whether or not generally available, that 
provides notional deductions with respect 
to equity. For purposes of  this definition, 
an administrative practice includes a ruling 
practice. 
For example, if  a taxpayer obtains a ruling 
providing that its foreign source interest 
income will be subject to a low rate of  
taxation in the residence State, and that 
rate is lower than the rate that generally 
would apply to foreign source interest 
income received by residents of  that State, 
the administrative practice under which the 
ruling is obtained is a special tax regime. 
Paragraph 2 of  the Protocol provides a 
list of  the legislation, regulations, and 
administrative practices existing in the 
other Contracting State at the time of  
the signature of  the Convention that the 
Contracting States agree are “special tax 
regimes” within the meaning of  paragraph 
1(l) of  Article 3.
This is clearly consistent with the single tax 
principle and with the original US LOB of  1981, 
which has been eroded in subsequent versions but is 
now returning with full force to deny treaty benefits 
(reductions in source taxation) in cases that the 
effective tax rate at residence is too low.
e. Subsequent Changes
A new article 28 provides that-
1. If  at any time after the signing of  this Convention, 
the general rate of  company tax applicable in 
either Contracting State falls below 15 percent 
with respect to substantially all of  the income 
of  resident companies, or either Contracting 
State provides an exemption from taxation to 
resident companies for substantially all foreign 
source income (including interest and royalties), 
the provisions of  Articles 10 (Dividends), 11 
(Interest), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other Income) 
may cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph 
4 of  this Article for payments to companies 
resident in both Contracting States. 
2. If  at any time after the signing of  this 
Convention, the highest marginal rate of  
individual tax applicable in either Contracting 
State falls below 15 percent with respect to 
substantially all income of  resident individuals, 
or either Contracting State provides an 
exemption from taxation to resident 
individuals for substantially all foreign source 
income (including interest and royalties), the 
provisions of  Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 may 
cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph 4 
of  this Article for payments to individuals 
resident in either Contracting State. 
3. For purposes of  this Article: 
a) the allowance of  generally available 
deductions based on a percentage of  what 
otherwise would be taxable income, or other 
similar mechanisms to achieve a reduction 
in the overall rate of  tax, shall be taken 
into account for purposes of  determining 
the general rate of  company tax or the 
highest marginal rate of  individual tax, as 
appropriate; and 
b) a tax that applies to a company only upon 
a distribution by such company, or that 
applies to shareholders, shall not be taken 
into account in determining the general rate 
of  company tax. 
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4.  If  the provisions of  either paragraph 1 or 
paragraph 2 of  this Article are satisfied by 
changes in law in one of  the Contracting 
States, the other Contracting State may notify 
the first- mentioned Contracting State through 
diplomatic channels that it will cease to apply 
the provisions of  Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21. In 
such case, the provisions of  such Articles shall 
cease to have effect in both Contracting States 
with respect to payments to resident individuals 
or companies, as appropriate, six months after 
the date of  such written notification, and the 
Contracting States shall consult with a view 
to concluding amendments to this Convention 
to restore an appropriate allocation of  taxing 
rights.
The Technical Explanation provides that-
The negotiation of  the Convention took into 
account the desire of  the two Contracting 
States to allocate taxing rights between 
them in a manner that would alleviate 
double taxation that could otherwise result 
if  cross-border income, profit or gain were 
taxed under the domestic laws of  the two 
Contracting States. The Contracting States 
recognize	 that	 certain	 subsequent	 changes	
to the domestic laws of  one or both of  
the Contracting States that lower taxation 
could reduce the risk of  double taxation 
but in addition increase the risk that the 
Convention would give rise to unwanted 
instances of  low or no taxation. In addition, 
such subsequent changes in law could draw 
into question the continued appropriateness 
of  the allocation of  taxing rights that was 
originally negotiated in the Convention. 
Article 28 addresses this possibility 
by providing that if, at any time after 
the signing of  the Convention, either 
Contracting State enacts certain changes to 
domestic law that could implicate the terms 
of  the Convention, certain benefits of  the 
Convention may cease to have effect, and 
if  so the Contracting States shall consult 
with a view to amending the Convention 
in a way that would restore an appropriate 
allocation of  taxing rights. 
Article 28 is consistent with the tax policy 
considerations that are relevant to the 
decision to enter into a tax treaty, or to 
amend an existing tax treaty, as articulated 
by the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
as amended by the Base Erosion and Profits 
Shifting initiative. 
Once again the consistency of  this provision 
with the single tax principle is explicit. The goal 
is to address subsequent harmful tax competition 
provisions that erode residence- based taxation in 
the treaty partner.
Overall these provisions show that in the BEPS 
context the US delegation pushed consistently for 
the implementation of  the single tax principle, while 
resisting efforts to upset the existing balance between 
residence and source countries by adopting more 
radical changes such as formulary apportionment 
(although country by country reporting may lead in 
this direction; this provision was not favored by the 
US).
6. Conclusion
The first model treaty, drafted by the League of  
Nations Committee of  Technical Experts in 1927,25 
explicitly acknowledged the single tax principle in 
its commentary. The commentary states:
From the very outset, [the drafters of  the 
model	convention]	realized	the	necessity	of 	
dealing with the questions of  tax evasion 
and double taxation in co-ordination with 
each other. It is highly desirable that States 
should come to an agreement with a view to 
ensuring that a taxpayer shall not be taxed 
on the same income by a number of  different 
countries, and it seems equally desirable 
that such international cooperation should 
prevent certain incomes from escaping 
taxation altogether. The most elementary and 
undisputed principles of  fiscal justice, therefore, 
required that the experts should devise a scheme 
whereby all incomes would be taxed once and 
only once.26
This language was implemented, for example, in 
the interest article by providing for a provisional 
withholding tax that would be refunded upon 
showing that the interest was declared in the country 
of  residence.
We have now come full circle, in that the US, the 
OECD and the G20 clearly have adopted the single 
tax principle as their goal. The specific measures 
in the final BEPS package fall short of  this goal, 
and the US model treaty provisions have not been 
incorporated into any treaty. But there is light at the 
end of  the tunnel. With further political pressure, 
double non-taxation may in fact be on its way to 
Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and The New US Model 
GLOBAL TAXATION | VOL. 1 | MAY 2016 | 21
extinction, as Secretary General Gurria has said. 
The vision of  Adams and Surrey (the principal US 
architects of  the international tax regime) is closer 
to fruition now than at any time since the foreign tax 
credit was enacted in 1918. The US should not let 
temporary pressures in the opposite direction, like 
the current legislative push for a patent box or for 
territoriality, stand in the way.
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